

Message Text

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S E C R E T SECTION 1 OF 5 MOSCOW 9830

EXDIS

E.O. 11652: XGDS-3

TAGS: PARM, US, UR

SUBJECT: TTBT/PNE NEGOTIATIONS: GENERAL SUMMARY AND ANALYSIS

TTBT/PNE DELEGATION MESSAGE NO. 62

I. PERIOD COVERED

ROUND III BEGAN ON JUNE 3, 1975. THIS SUMMARY COVERS PERIOD JUNE 3 THROUGH JULY 14, AND INCLUDES ALL SIGNIFICANT ITEMS CARRIED OVER FROM PREVIOUS ROUNDS.

II. CRITERIA FOR AGREEMENT

US SIDE HAS, SINCE START OF ROUND I (REF STATE 221218, OCTOBER 8, 1974), STATED THAT A PNE AGREEMENT MUST SATISFY FOLLOWING THREE CRITERIA:

- A. PNES MUST NOT PROVIDE WEAPON-RELATED BENEFITS OTHERWISE PRECLUDED OR LIMITED BY THE TTBT.
- B. THE FACT PNE ACTIVITIES ARE NOT CONTRIBUTING TO SUCH BENEFITS MUST BE ADEQUATELY VERIFIABLE.
- C. THE AGREEMENT MUST BE CONSISTENT WITH EXISTING TREATY OBLIGATIONS, INCLUDING IN PARTICULAR THE LIMITED TEST BAN TREATY (LTBT).

SOVIET SIDE HAS STATED SEVERAL TIMES THAT IT AGREES WITH THESE CRITERIA AS BASIS FOR AN AGREEMENT.

III. GENERAL ATMOSPHERE OF NEGOTIATIONS

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ATMOSPHERE HAS BEEN GENERALLY CORDIAL AND CONSTRUCTIVE

TIVE. THERE HAVE BEEN SEVERAL FLASHES OF SOMEWHAT CRUDE COMMENTS BY HEAD OF SOVIET DELEGATION (E.G., REFERENCES TO INCOMPETENCE OF US EXPERTS OR/AND SOVIET INTERPRETER, AND ILLOGICAL US STANDS), BUT IT HAS NEVER BEEN CLEAR WHETHER SUCH REMARKS WERE DIRECTED AT PEOPLE AT NEGOTIATING TABLE OR PLAYED TO AN AUDIENCE WITHIN SOVIET GOVERNMENT. US DELEGATION HAS TAKEN NO NOTE OF SUCH EXPRESSIONS AND DOES NOT INTEND TO IN THE FUTURE.

THERE ARE NOW SIGNS OF GENUINE IMPATIENCE BECAUSE OF EVIDENT IMPRESSION THAT US SIDE IS STALLING BY NOT:

- (A) STATING PROPOSED DIGURE FOR YIEL LIMIT ON INDIVIDUAL EXCAVATION EXPLOSIONS, AND
- (B) INDICATING WILLINGNESS TO BEGIN WORK ON DRAFT TEXT.

IV. STRUCTURAL AGREEMENTS

TWO SIDES ARE IN APPARENT ACCORD ON FOLLOWING ITEMS AS STRUCTURAL BASIS FOR AN AGREEMENT:

- (1) INDIVIDUAL CONTAINED EXPLOSIONS SHOULD BE SUBJECT TO AN AGREED LIMIT ON MAXIMUM YIELD, AND THAT AGREED LIMIT MUST NOT BE GREATER THAN WEAPON-TEST THRESHOLD IN TTBT.
- (2) INDIVIDUAL EXCAVATION EXPLOSIONS SHOULD BE SUBJECT TO AN AGREED LIMIT ON MAXIMUM YIELD (BUT SEE "NOTE 1" BELOW).
- (3) INDIVIDUAL EXCAVATION EXPLOSIONS SHOULD BE SUBJECT TO AN AGREED LIMIT ON MAXIMUM PORTION OF TOTAL YIELD PRODUCED BY NUCLEAR FISSION (ALTHOUGH THERE IS NOT AGREEMENT ON YIELD RANGE IN WHICH THIS LIMITATION WILL APPLY; US SIDE SAYS AT ALL YIELDS, SOVIET SIDE SAYS ABOVE 150 KILOTONS).
- (4) INDIVIDUAL EXCAVATION EXPLOSIONS SHOULD BE SUBJECT TO AN AGREED LIMIT ON MINIMUM DEPTH-OF-BURIAL.
- (5) AGGREGATE YIELDS OF GROUPS OF CONTAINED EXPLOSIONS MUST BE SUBJECT TO SAME LIMIT AS THAT AREED UPON FOR SINGLE CONTAINED EXPLOSIONS IF YIELD VERIFICATION IS TO BE BASED ON TELESEISMIC MEANS.
- (6) THERE SHOULD BE AN EXPLICIT DEFINITION OF GROUP EXPLOSION IN TERMS OF SPACING IN DISTANCE AND TIME BETWEEN INDIVIDUAL EXPLOSIONS IN GROUP, AND NUMERICAL VALUES IN THAT DEFINITION SHOULD REFLECT ABILITY OF

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TELESEISMIC SYSTEMS TO RESOLVE AND MEASURE YIELDS OF INDIVIDUAL EXPLOSIONS.

- (7) CONTAINED GROUP EXPLOSIONS VERIFIED THROUGH ON-SITE PROCEDURES SHOULD BE SUBJECT TO AN AGREED LIMIT ON MAXIMUM AGGREGATE YIELD.

- (8) EXCAVATION GROUP EXPLOSIONS VERIFIED THROUGH ON-SITE PROCEDURES SHOULD BE SUBJECT TO AGREED LIMIT ON MAXIMUM AGGREGATE YIELD.

(9) EXCAVATION GROUP EXPLOSIONS MUST BE SUBJECT TO AN AGREED LIMIT ON MINIMUM SPACING BETWEEN INDIVIDUAL EXPLOSIONS IN GROUP.

(10) EXCAVATION GROUP EXPLOSIONS MUST BE LAID OUT IN SUBSTANTIALLY LINEAR FASHION IF YIELD MEASUREMENT IS TO BE BASED ON CRATER DIMENSIONS.

(11) ANY EXPLOSION PLANNED TO BE OF "RETARC" TYPE SHOULD BE CONSIDERED TO BE CONTAINED EXPLOSION AND SHOULD BE SUBJECT TO LIMITATIONS AND VERIFICATION PROVISIONS APPLICABLE TO CONTAINED EXPLOSIONS.

(12) SINGLE EXPLOSIONS ABOVE AN AGREED YIELD LEVEL (LESS THAN AGREED LIMIT ON MAXIMUM YIELD) MUST BE VERIFIED THROUGH ON-SITE PROCEDURES (BUT, SOVIET SIDE SAYS THIS MUST BE DONE AT THE DISCRETION OF HOST SIDE).

(13) ANY GROUP EXPLOSION PLANNED TO HAVE AN AGGREGATE GROUP YIELD GREATER THAN AGREED LIMIT ON MAXIMUM YIELD OF AN INDIVIDUAL EXPLOSION MUST BE VERIFIED THROUGH ON-SITE PROCEDURES INCLUDING OBSERVERS, AND MUST BE SUBJECT TO ADDITIONAL CONDITIONS REQUIRED TO MAKE EFFECTIVE THE AGREED VERIFICATION PROCEDURES.

(14) PROCEDURES FOR ON-SITE VERIFICATION OF GROUP EXPLOSIONS PLANNED TO HAVE AN AGGREGATE YIELD GREATER THAN AGREED LIMIT ON MAXIMUM YIELD OF AN INDIVIDUAL EXPLOSION WILL INCLUDE PROCEDURES FOR VERIFYING ABSENCE OF COLLATERAL UNANNOUNCED EXPLOSIONS.

(15) VERIFICATION OF FISSION YIELD LIMITATION ON EXCAVATION EXPLOSIONS WILL BE BASED ON COLLECTION AND ANALYSIS OF "MELT SAMPLES" (BUT SEE NOTE 2, BELOW).

(16) OBSERVERS MUST HAVE RIGHT TO SELECT AND COLLECT AN AGREED MINIMUM NUMBER OF MELT SAMPLES FOR EACH INDIVIDUAL EXPLOSION TO WHICH FISSION-YIELD LIMIT IS APPLICABLE (BUT SEE NOTE 2, BELOW).

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(17) IF AN EXPLOSION IS PLANNED TO BE AN EXCAVATION EXPLOSION AND TO EJECT MELT SAMPLES TO SURFACE, BUT FAILS TO DO SO, THEN VERIFYING SIDE SHALL HAVE RIGHT TO DEMAND THAT HOST SIDE DRILL BACK FOR MELT SAMPLES AND MAKE THEM AVAILABLE TO VERIFYING SIDE FOR ANALYSIS (BUT THERE IS NOT AGREEMENT ON YIELD RANGE OF APPLICATION -- SEE ALSO NOTE 2).

(18) YIELD VERIFICATION THROUGH TELESEISMIC MEASUREMENTS WILL REQUIRE EXCHANGE OF VALID INFORMATION.

(19) KINDS AND AMOUNTS OF INFORMATION THAT NEED TO BE EXCHANGED WILL DEPEND UPON PLANNED YIELD, MEDIA IN WHICH EXPLOSION WILL TAKE PLACE, AND AGREED PROCEDURES FOR VERIFICATION.

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(20) YIELD VERIFICATION THROUGH MEASUREMENTS OF
CRATER DIMENSIONS WILL REQUIRE EXCHANGE OF VALID INFORMATION.

(21) YIELD VERIFICATION OF GROUP EXPLOSIONS THROUGH
ON-SITE PROCEDURES WILL REQUIRE EXCHANGE OF VALID INFORMATION.

(22) INFORMATION ON PLACE, DATE, TIME, PLANNED
AGGREGATE YIELD, ROCK TYPE, AND PURPOSE WILL BE EXCHANGED
FOR ALL EXPLOSIONS REGARDLESS OF YIELD OR OTHER FACTORS.

NOTE 1: A SIGNIFICANT STRUCTURAL ITEM REMAINING TO BE
RESOLVED IS DIFFERENCE BETWEEN US AND SOVIET
POSITIONS ON POSSIBLE EXCEPTIONS TO GENERAL AGREED YIELD
LIMIT ON INDIVIDUAL EXCAVATION EXPLOSIONS. SOVIET SIDE HAS
STATED IT ESSENTIAL TO HAVE PROVISION FOR "A FEW" SUCH
EXCEPTIONS; US SIDE HAS EXPRESSED FLAT OPPOSITION TO ANY
SUCH EXCEPTIONS.

NOTE 2: ANOTHER SIGNIFICANT STRUCTURAL DIFFERENCE CONCERNS
ANALYSIS OF MELT SAMPLES. IT IS US POSITION THAT OBSERVERS
MUST TAKE THESE MATERIALS TO THEIR OWN
COUNTRY FOR UNRESTRICTED ANALYSIS. SOVIET POSITION
(WITH SUBSTANTIAL SIGNS OF LACK OF FIRMNESS) IS THAT
MELT SAMPLES SHOULD BE ANALYZED UNDER CERTAIN RESTRICTIONS
IN FACILITIES TO BE PROVIDED BY HOST SIDE.

V. STATUS ON BASIC NUMERICAL VALUES OR CONDITIONS
MANY OF THE STRUCTURAL ITEMS IN IV MUST HAVE ASSOCIATED WITH
THEM AGREED NUMERICAL VALUES OR CONDITIONS. TWO SIDES
ARE, OR MAY BE, IN AGREEMENT ON SOME OF THESE AS NOTED BELOW
BUT ON IMPORTANT ITEMS THERE ARE SUBSTANTIAL DIFFERENCES

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BETWEEN FIGURES PROPOSED BY TWO SIDES. US FIGURES
FALL ON SIDE OF TIGHTER CONSTRAINTS.

FIGURES PROPOSED BY TWO SIDES, LISTED BY ITEM NUMBERS IN
SECTION IV, ARE AS FOLLOWS (ITEMS NOT LISTED BELOW
ARE QUALITATIVE ONLY):

ITEM

NO.	SUBJECT	US FIGURE	SIVUET FIG
(1)	YIELD LIMIT, INDIVIDUAL CONTAINED	100 KT	150 KT
(2)	YIELD LIMIT, INDIVIDUAL EXCAVATION	NONE STATED	500 KT
(3)	FISSION YIELD LIMIT (A) LIMIT (B) YIELD RANGE OF APPLICATION	0.2 KT ALL YIELDS	PERHAPS 0.2 KT OVER 150 KT
(4)	DEPTH-OF-BURIAL LIMIT	AGREED FORMULA: GREATER THAN 30 METERS X 3.4 ROOT OF YIELD IN KT	
(5)	YIELD LIMIT, AGGREGATE, CONTAINED GROUPS VERIFIED BY TELESEISMIC MEANS	100 KT	150 KT
(6)	SISTANCE AND TIME CONDITIONS ON GROUPS (1) DISTANCE (B) TIME	40 KM. 5 SEC.	10 KM. 2 SEC.
(7)	YIELD LIMIT, AGGREGATE, CONTAINED GROUPS	500 IT 3 MT (MAY BE X1 MT UNDER DOME CONDITIONS)	
(8)	YIELD LIMIT, AGGREGATE, EXCAVATION	500 KT	3 MT
(9)	MINIMUM SPACING FOR SECRET		

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EXCAVATION AGREED FORMULA: NOT LESS
THAN DEPTH-OF-BURIAL
(10) CONDITION OF LINEAR FORM

EXCAVATION NONE STATED NONE STATED

(12) YIELD THRESHOLD FOR
OBSERVERS 10 KT "NEAR"
 MAXIMUM
 INDIVIDUAL YIELD
 THRESHOLD

(16) NUMBER OF MELT SAMPLES NONE STATED 10

(17) DRILLBACK IF NO MELT
 SAMPLES AVAILABLE;
 YIELD RANGE OF
 APPLICATION ALL YIELDS ACTUAL YIELD
 OVER 150 KT

VI. COMMENTS ON CERTAIN ITEMS IN IV AND V
 SOME CLARIFYING COMMENTS SEEM IN ORDER RELATIVE
TO FOLLOWING ITEMS IN SECTIONS IV AND V

-- MOROKHOV CONTINUES TO SAY THAT SOVIET POSITION ON
FISSION YIELD LIMIT DEPENDS UPON EVENTUAL AGREED YIELD LIMIT
ON INDIVIDUAL EXCAVATION EXPLOSIONS. BASED ON STATEMENTS
OF OTHERS ON SOVIET SIDE, WE THINK THIS MAINLY MEANS THAT THEY
WILL ONLY APPLY THE FISSION YIELD LIMIT TO EXCAVATION EX-
PLOSIONS THAT INVOLVE INDIVIDUAL EXPLOSIONS LARGER THAN TTBT
THRESHOLD. WHETHER OR NOT THEY WILL TRY TO ARGUE FOR FIGURE
OTHER THAN 0.2 KILOTON IS SOMETHING WE ARE LIKELY TO LEARN
ONLY WHEN SPECIFIC FIGURE FOR YIELD LIMIT IS UNDER SERIOUS
DISCUSSION.

-- WE DO NOT YET KNOW WHETHER OR NOT IT WILL BE
DIFFICULT TO REACH AGREEMENT ON FIGURES FOR SPACINGS IN DISTANCE
AND TIME THAT DEFINE GROUP EXPLOSIONS (ITEM IV (6)). SOVIET
SIDE DID NOT PRESENT THEIR ARGUMENTS ON THIS POINT. DELEGATION
WILL PURSUE THE MATTER PROMPTLY.

VII. SOVIET TOWARD US POSITION
 THUS FAR IN ROUND III THE SIDE HAS MOVED TOWARD THE US
POSITION ON ITEMS (6), (7), (8), (9),
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((10), (11), (12), (15), (16), (17), (19), (20), AND
(22) OF SECTION IV AND CORRESPONDING NUMERICAL VALUES IN
SECTION V.

 IN ADDITION TO ITEMS ABOVE, SOVIETS HAVE ALSO:
-- AGREED WITH US SIDE THAT SLIFERS ARE AN
ACCEPTABLE METHOD FOR MEASURING YIELDS OF INDIVIDUAL
EXPLOSIONS IN GROUPS BUT HAVE INSISTED ON INCLUDING REFERENCE
TO AN UNDESCRIBED SOVIET SYSTEM SIMILAR TO SLIFER.
THEY ARE RETAINING REFERENCE TO USE OF SUB-SURFACE GROUND
MOTION GAUGES; BUT THEY APPEAR TO BE INCREASINGLY RECEPTIVE

TO SLIFERS. THEY ARGUE THAT SUCH INSTRUMENTATION SHOULD BE FABRICATED, INSTALLED AND OPERATED BY THE HOST.

- AGREED ON US FORMULATION OF GEOMETRICAL CONDITIONS FOR USE OF SUB-SURFACE GROUND MOTION GAUGES BUT HAVE NOT AGREED TO US NUMERICAL VALUES FOR TYPICAL WIDTHS OF SHOCK PULSE.

-- AGREED WITH US POSITION THAT SURFACE GROUND-MOTION GAUGES ARE UNSATISFACTORY FOR YIELD DETERMINATION.

-- AGREED WITH US ESTIMATES OF ACCURACY OF YIELD AS DETERMINED FROM CRATER DIMENSIONS.

-- AGREED ON INFORMATION REQUIRED FOR USE OF CLOSE-IN MEASUREMENTS FOR YIELD DETERMINATION.

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VIII. US MOVEMENT TOWARD SOVIET POSITION

THUS FAR IN ROUND III, US SIDE HAS MOVED TOWARD SOVIET POSITION IN FOLLOWING WAYS:

(A) WE HAVE AGREED THAT LESSER AMOUNTS OF INFORMATION NEED TO BE EXCHANGED TO SUPPORT VERIFICATION AT PROGRESSIVELY LOWER YIELD LEVELS (SEE SECTION XI, BELOW).

(B) WE HAVE AGREED THAT OBSERVER RIGHTS ARE NOT NEEDED TO SUPPORT VERIFICATION AT YIELD LEVELS BELOW SOME AGREED FIGURE. WE HAVE STATED THAT DIVIDING LINE SHOULD BE DRAWN AT 10 KILOTONS.

(C) WE HAVE AGREED TO CHANGE OUR PROPOSED LIMIT ON MINIMUM DEPTH-OF-BURIAL FOR EXCAVATION EXPLOSIONS FROM 30 METERS TIMES CUBE ROOT OF YIELD IN KILOTONS TO 30 METERS TIMES 3.4 ROOT OF YIELD IN KILOTONS.

IX. ATTITIONAL CONCESSIONS ALLOWED BY CURRENT INSTRUCTIONS

WITHIN TERMS OF CURRENT INSTRUCTIONS (STATE 138355),
DELEGATION BELIEVES IT HAS AUTHORITY TO MAKE ADDITIONAL
CONCESSIONS AS FOLLOWS:

(A) DELETE REQUIREMENT FOR OBSERVERS FOR EVENTS
SMALLER THAN 50 KILOTONS.

(B) DELETE REQUIREMENTS FOR EXCHANGE OF DETAILED
GEOLOGICAL INFORMATION AND DETAILED PROJECT DESCRIP-
TION FOR EVENTS SMALLER THAN 50 KILOTONS.

(C) GO FARTHER THAN WE HAVE TO DATE ON SUBJECT OF
COOPERATION BY SAYING THAT US IS WILLING TO DECLARE AN
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INTENTION TO COOPERATE IN PNE FIELD ON BASIS OF
RECIPROCITY AND MUTUAL BENEFIT, IN WAYS CONSISTENT
WITH APPLICABLE DOMESTIC LAWS, WHILE ALSO SAYING, HOWEVER, THAT
VERIFICATION REQUIREMENTS FOR PNE AGREEMENT PURSUANT TO ARTICLE
III OF TTBT MUST BE WORKED OUT BEFORE PROCEEDING TO DISCUSS
SPECIFIC ARRANGEMENTS FOR US/USSR PNE COOPERATION.

X. COMMENTS ON ITMES IN IX

DELEGATION VIEWS ON AUTHORIZED CONCESSIONS ARE AS FOLLOWS:

(A) WE JAVE MP PRESENT INTENTION OF DELETING
REQUIRMENT FOR OBSERVERS BELOW 50 KILOTONS. ON BASIS OF
UNDERSTANDINGS AT THIS TIME ON INFORMATION EXCHANGE, WE HAVE
TAKEN THE POSITION THAT OBSERVER RIGHTS SHOULD BE PROVIDED
EXCEPT FOR EVENTS BELOW 10 KILOTONS.

(B) WE HAVE ACKNOWLEDGED THAT LESS INFORMATION IS NEEDED AT
SMALLER YIELDS BUT HAVE COME TO AGREEMENT WITH SOVIET SIDE
ON GRADUATED INFORMATION EXCHANGE BELOW 50 KILOTONS AS WELL
AS CONTENT OF INFORMATION TO BE EXCHANGED. WE DO NOT INTEND
TO MAKE USE OF AUTHORIZED CONCESSION.

(C) WE DO NOT INTEND TO USE AUTHORIZED POSITION ON
COOPERATION UNTIL: (I) SOVIETS HAVE MADE THEIR VIEWS MORE
CLEAR; (II) SOME ADVANTAGE CAN BE SEEN IN USING THIS
AUTHORIZATION.

XI. STATUS ON INFORMATION EXCHANGE

TWO SIDES HAVE AGREED ON EXCHANGE OF FOLLOWING
INFORMATION PRIOR TO ANY EXPLOSIONS REGARDLESS OF
YIELD: FACT THAT AN EXPLOSION WILL TAKE PLACE; DATE; TIME;
PLACE IN GEOGRAPHICAL COORDINATES; PLANNED AGGREGATE YIELD;
AND PURPOSE. AGREED THAT PURPOSE INCLUDES KIND OF ROCK AT
POINT OF EXPLOSION.

TWO SIDES HAVE AGREED TO EXCHANGE INFORMATION TO ASSIST IN
VERIFICATION OF YIELDS BY TELESEISMIC METHODS. THIS IN-
FORMATION WILL BE GRADUATED ACCORDING TO YIELD AND GEOLOGICAL
AND TECHNOLOGICAL FEATURES OF THE EXPLOSION. WHEN THE FULL
VOLUME OF INFORMATION IS PROVIDED AND THE INFORMATION IS VALID,

IN VIEW OF EXPERTS OF BOTH SIDES, ACCURACY IN VERIFYING
YIELDS OF CONTAINED PNES IN PROXIMITY OF TTBT YIELD THRESHOLD
WILL BE CLOSE TO ACCURACY IN VERIFYING EXPLOSIONS OF SIMILAR
YIELD THAT ARE CARRIED OUT ON WEAPON TEST SITES. AGREED THAT
TELESEISMIC YIELD VERIFICATION OF EXCAVATION EXPLOSIONS NEAR
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THRESHOLD MIGHT BE SUBJECT TO GREATER UNCERTAINTIES.

SPECIFIC AGREED ITEMS OF INFORMATION TO SUPPORT
TELESEISMIC YIELD VERIFICATION ARE LISTED IN MOSCOW 8735,
PARA 3. A POINT REMAINING TO BE CLARIFIED IS HOW ROCK
STRENGTH IS TO BE DEFINED AND MEASURED.

IT HAS ALSO BEEN AGREED THAT ADDITIONAL INFORMATION SHOULD
BE EXCHANGED UNDER FOLLOWING CIRCUMSTANCES: WHEN INDIVIDUAL
YIELDS OF CONTAINED GROUP EXPLOSIONS ARE DETERMINED BY GROUND
MOTION SENSORS AND BY SLIFER TECHNIQUE; WHEN YIELDS OF EX-
CAVATION EXPLOSIONS ARE TO BE DETERMINED BY MEASURING DIMENSIONS
OF CRATERS; AND WHEN FISSION YIELD IS TO BE DETERMINED
BY COLLECTING MELT SAMPLES. STATUS ON INFORMATION ITEMS
FOR THESE PURPOSES IS SUMMARIZED IN DETAIL IN MOSCOW 8954,
PARA 6, MOSCOW 9267, PARA 8, AND MOSCOW 9767.

OPINION OF DELEGATION IS THAT WORKABLE AGREEMENT IS IN SIGHT
ON ALL SIGNIFICANT ITEMS EXCEPT THOSE WHICH THE SOVIET SIDE
INSISTS UPON DEFERRING UNTIL OBSERVER FUNCTIONS ARE
BETTER DEFINED.

AGREEMENT INCLUDES POINT THAT SOME VALID INFORMATION, AT
LEAST ROCK TYPE, IS NEEDED FOR EXPLOSIONS ABOVE 10 KILOTONS.

XII. STATUS ON OBSERVERS

SOVIETS HAVE AGREED THAT OBSERVERS OR REPRESENTA-
TIVES SHOULD BE PRESENT FOR CERTAIN PNE APPLICATIONS:
CONTAINED GROUP EXPLOSIONS WITH AGGREGATE YIELD ABOVE AGREED
INDIVIDUAL YIELD LIMIT; EXCAVATION EXPLOSIONS IF YIELD IS ABOVE
150 KILOTONS. THEY HAVE ALSO SAID THERE COULD BE
CIRCUMSTANCES FOR CONTAINED EVENTS WITH YIELD LOWER, BUT NEAR
THE YIELD LIMIT, WHERE SIDE CONDUCTING THE EXPLOSION WOULD
INVITE OBSERVERS FROM VERIFYING SIDE.

SOVIETS HAVE NOT SPOKEN TO SUBJECT OF OBSERVER RIGHTS AND
FUNCTIONS EXCEPT IN EXPERT GROUP IV AS THEY APPLIED TO
VERIFICATION OF FISSION-YIELD LIMIT AND IN EXPERT GROUP VI AS
THEY APPLIED TO CLOSE-IN YIELD MEASUREMENTS.

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OBSERVERS WOULD SELECT MELT SAMPLES, AND, ACCORDING TO SOVIET POSITION, PERFORM ANALYSIS OF MELT SAMPLES IN COUNTRY OF SIDE CONDUCTING EXPLOSION. SOVIETS HAVE ARGUED THAT FABRICATION, INSTALLATION AND OPERATING OF SLIFER EQUIPMENT SHOULD BE DONE BY HOST PARTY UNDER OBSERVATION OF VERIFYING SIDE.

IT SEEMS UNLIKELY THAT SOVIET SIDE WILL ENTER INTO ANY DETAILED DISCUSSION OF OBSERVER RIGHTS AND FUNCTIONS UNTIL THERE IS AN UNDERSTANDING OF US POSITION ON INDIVIDUAL EXCAVATION YIELD LIMIT AND DRAFTING HAS BEGUN.

US SIDE GAVE ILLUSTRATIVE EXAMPLES OF ITS VIEW OF OBSERVER RIGHTS AND FUNCTIONS IN ROUND II. IN ROUND III, US SIE PROPOSED THAT OBSERVER ACTIVITIES APPLY TO ALL YIELDS GREATER THAN 10 KILOTONS. US SIDE DESCRIBED, IN PLENARY OF JULY 10, OBSERVER RIGHTS AND FUNCTIONS WHICH WOULD BE NEEDED TO VERIFY INFORMATION EXCHANGED TO ASSIST IN TELESEISMIC DETERMINATION OF YIELD, AS SET FORTH BY EXPERT GROUP I. IN SUCCEEDING PLENARIES, US SIDE INTENDS TO DESCRIBE OBSERVER RIGHTS AND FUNCTIONS AS THEY APPLY TO OTHER TECHNICAL VERIFICATION METHODS AS DESCRIBED BY EXPERT GROUPS.

XIII. STATUS ON LTBT COMPLIANCE

PRIOR TO ROUND III, BOTH SIDES HAD REPEATEDLY STATED THAT PNEs MUST BE CONSISTENT WITH EXISTING INTERNATIONAL OBLIGATIONS, INCLUDING LTBT.

IN ROUND III, US SIDE INITIATED DISCUSSION IN RESTRICTED MEETING OF SPECIFIC QUESTION OF RELATIONSHIP OF PNE

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EXCAVATION TO LTBT COMPLIANCE. WE STATED THAT US STUDIES INDICATE THAT IT DOES NOT APPEAR TO BE POSSIBLE TO CARRY OUT MAJOR PNE EXCAVATION WITHOUT VIOLATING LTBT, AND ASKED SOVIET

SIDE HOW IT WOULD PLAN TO CARRY OUT EXCAVATION PNES WITHOUT VIOLATING LTBT. REFERENCE WAS ALSO MADE TO HISTORY OF US NOTES RELATIVE TO SOVIET WEAPON TESTS CAUSING RADIOACTIVE DEBRIS TO BE PRESENT OUTSIDE SOVIET NATIONAL BORDERS.

THUS FAR, REPLY OF SOVIET SIDE HAS BEEN IN TERMS OF THE FOLLOWING:

- NOTHING NEEDS TO BE DONE ABOUT THIS QUESTION IN THESE NEGOTIATIONS EXCEPT TO AGREE THAT A PNE AGREEMENT MUST INCLUDE SPECIFIC REAFFIRMATION OF LTBT.
 - THERE HAVE ALREADY BEEN THREE ROUNDS OF TECHNICAL TALKS BETWEEN US AND SOVIET SIDES ABOUT EXCAVATION AND LTBT COMPLIANCE, BUT WHEN SOVIET UNION WANTED FOURTH ROUND IN NOVEMBER 1974 US SIDE HAD LOST INTEREST AND TALKS WERE NOT HELD.
 - SOVIET UNION ALWAYS HAS AND ALWAYS WILL COMPLY WITH LTBT.
 - THEY ARE BEING PATIENT ABOUT ALL THOSE US NOTES ABOUT SOVIET WEAPON TESTS, BUT DON'T UNDERSTAND WHY US KEEPS DOING THIS.
 - US NOTES ABOUT SOVIET WEAPON TESTS ARE NOT REALLY DUE TO CONCERN ABOUT LTBT COMPLIANCE; THEY ARE TIMED TO HAVE POLITICAL EFFECT ON SOME OTHER ASPECT OF US-SOVIET RELATIONS, E.G., PRESENT NEGOTIATIONS.
 - SOVIET TESTS TO WHICH US NOTES HAVE BEEN DIRECTED HAVE ALL, OR NEARLY ALL, BEEN CONTAINED EXPLOSIONS ANYWAY AND HAVE NOTHING TO DO WITH CONDUCT OF EXCAVATION PNES.
 - ANY NUCLEAR EXPLOSIONS, EVEN COMPLETELY CONTAINED EXPLOSIONS, WILL CAUSE SOME AMOUNT OF "SECONDARY" OR "DAUGHTER" RADIOACTIVITY TO BE PRESENT OUTSIDE NATIONAL BORDERS.
 - LTBT COMPLIANCE, TO SOVIET UNION, MEANS NOT CAUSING AN INCREASE IN GENERAL BACKGROUND RADIOACTIVITY.
 - WHAT DOES US SIDE MEAN BY "MAJOR" PNE EXCAVATION?
 - SOVIET UNION HAS TECHNOLOGICAL MEANS FOR CARRY-ING OUT EXCAVATION PNES SO THAT NO RADIOACTIVITY WILL BE PLACED OUTSIDE NATIONAL BORDERS, EXCEPT FOR OCCASIONAL ACCIDENTS.
 - THESE TECHNOLOGICAL MEANS ARE COMBINATION OF:
 - (I) PROJECT DESIGN,
 - (II) DESIGN OF EXPLOSIVES, AND
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(III) SPECIAL EMPLACEMENT TECHNIQUES.

- HOW SOVIET UNION WOULD CARRY OUT EXCAVATION PNES IN COMPLIANCE WITH LTBT IS ITS OWN NATIONAL AFFAIR AND IT WILL GIVE NO ACCOUNTING TO ANYONE ABOUT IT.
- SOVIET UNION MIGHT ALLOW US ACCESS TO ITS TECHNOLOGICAL SECRETS ON THIS MATTER IN FRAMEWORK OF COOPERATION.
- AN ILLUSTRATION OF ONE WAY TO PROCEED IN FULL COMPLIANCE WITH LTBT AND PRODUCE AN EFFECT LIKE EXCAVATION WOULD BE TO PLACE A FULLY CONTAINED PNE HIGH ON A SLOPE AND CAUSE A LANDSLIDE.

ALL OF FOREGOING HAVE COME OUT OF EXTEMPORANEOUS REMARKS BY MOROKHOV IN RESTRICTED MEETINGS.

ON JULY 8, IN RESTRICTED MEETING, MOROKHOV SAID THAT, SINCE US DIDE HAD CHOSEN TO MAKE FORMAL STATEMENTS ABOUT LTBT COMPLIANCE, HE WOULD REPLY IN FORMAL MANNER. ON JULY 14, IN RESTRICTED MEETING, MOROKHOV SAID IZRAEL WAS ASKED TO PREPARE THAT REPLY; AND IT WILL BE PRESENTED ON JULY 16 IF IZRAEL HAS FINISHED BY THEN.

US SIDE HAS MAINTAINED THAT, IN ASKING HOW SOVIET SIDE WOULD CARRY OUT EXCAVATION IN COMPLIANCE WITH LTBT, WE ARE NOT SEEKING TO INQUIRE INTO SOVIET NATIONAL ACTIVITIES. WE ARE SEEKING BASIS FOR JOINING WITH SOVIET SIDE IN AN IMPORTANT AGREEMENT; BUT THAT WE, OURSELVES, DO NOT SEE HOW TO CARRY OUT MAJOR EXCAVATION PNES IN COMPLIANCE WITH LTBT. WE HAVE STATED THAT US NOTES ON SOVIET WEAPON TESTS HAVE DERIVED SOLELY FROM US CONCERN ABOUT COMPLIANCE WITH LTBT. FINALLY, OUR FORMAL STATEMENT MADE CLEAR THAT US IS NOT PREPARED TO DEVELOP A PNE AGREEMENT CONTAINING PROVISIONS THAT STATE OR IMPLY THAT AGREEMENT WOULD PERMIT PNE EXCAVATIONS THAT WOULD CONTRAVENE LTBT.

XIV. STATUS ON COOPERATION

DELEGATION JUDGMENT AT CLOSE OF ROUND II WAS THAT FOR FOMESTIC REASONS SOVIET SIDE NEEDS NON-SPECIFIC MENTION OF COOPERATION, BUT NOTHING MORE. THAT JUDGMENT HAS NOT CHANGED. WE BELIEVE THEY NEED LANGUAGE THAT CAN BE USED TO SUPPORT STATEMENTS THAT ACTIVITIES UNDER AGREEMENT ARE BASED ON COOPERATION, ESPECIALLY IF AND WHEN US PERSONNEL APPEAR IN SOVIET UNION ON OBSERVATION MISSIONS.

SOVIET EXPRESSIONS ON COOPERATION IN ROUND III HAVE CONTINUED TO BE VAGUE, EXCEPT FOR MENTION OF THREE SPECIFIC
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POINTS, AS FOLLOWS:

(A) THROUGH COOPERATION, TWO SIDES WILL TAKE CARE OF THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN EXCAVATION PNES AND LTBT COMPLIANCE. THIS IDEA WAS EXPRESSED IN THE CONTEXT OF AN AGRUMENT THAT THE MATTER OF SUCH COMPLIANCE IS SOLELY A TECHNICAL PROBLEM NOT RELEVANT TO THESE NEGOTIATIONS.

(B) THROUGH COOPERATION, TWO SIDES CAN HEAD OFF "UNDESIRABLE" MOTIONS OF OTHER PARTIES IN IAEA, NPT REVIEW CONFERENCE, ETC.

(C) AS TIME GOES ON THERE WILL ARISE TECHNOLOGICAL AND OTHER CIRCUMSTANCES NOT ANTICIPATED IN FORMULATING TERMS OF A PNE AGREEMENT, AND THESE CAN BEST BE DEALT WITH ON BASIS OF COOPERATION.

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DELEGATION VIEW IS THAT:

(A) US SHOULD NOT COME NEAR GETTING COOPTED INTO TAKING OR SHARING RESPONSIBILITY FOR SOVIET ACTIONS AS REGARDS A MATTER LIKE LTBT COMPLIANCE; AND

(B) US AND SOVIET UNION CAN ACT IN CONCERT, FORMALLY OR INFORMALLY, IN INTERNATIONAL PROCEEDINGS WHENEVER THEIR INTERESTS LEAD THEM TO DO SO.

(C) THERE IS MERIT IN ARGUMENT THAT NO AGREEMENT ON IMMATURE TECHNOLOGY LIKE PNES CAN BE DRAWN UP WHICH WILL HAVE ANTICIPATED EVERYTHING THAT MAY ARISE DURING ITS PERIOD IN FORCE.

DELEGATION RECOMMENDATION ON LANGUAGE OF ARTICLE VII IS DIRECTED AT POINT (C) ABOVE. WE HAVE DRAWN ON LANGUAGE FORMAT OF ARTICLE XIII OF THE ABM TREATY, WHICH COULD CONTEMPLATE MECHANISM LIKE SCC.

MOROKHOV SET FORTH VIEWS OF SOVIET SIDE ON COOPERATION AT RESTRICTED MEETING JULY 14, REPORTED SEPTEL. THEY CONTAIN NOTHING SUBSTANTIALLY NEW OR DIFFERENT.

XV. DRAFT TREATY AND PROTOCOLS

CURRENT VERSION OF DRAFT TREATY TEXT WAS FORWARDED TO DELEGATION IN STATE 158606. DELEGATION COMMENTS WERE PROVIDED IN MOSCOW 9464 AND MOSCOW 9578. DELEGATION PLANS NO FURTHER COMMENTS ON THIS VERSION OF TEXT.

DELEGATION WAS ADVISED IN STATE 155884, PARA 2, THAT "PROTOCOLS ARE STILL IN PROCESS OF REDRAFTING AND ARE NOT SECRET

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SUITABLE FOR FORWARDING."

MOST RECENT VERSION OF PROTOCOLS AVAILABLE TO DELEGATION IS DATED MAY 29, 1975. DELEGATION COMMENTS ON THAT VERSION WERE PROVIDED IN MOSCOW 8788 AND MOSCOW 9584. DELEGATION PLANS NO FURTHER COMMENTS ON THIS VERSION OF PROTOCOLS.

SOVIET SIDE HAS STATED IT HAS TEXT AND IS READY TO WORK ON DRAFTING AT ANY TIME. MOROKHOV AND TIMERBAEV HAVE HAD COPIES WITH THEM AT TABLE AND HAVE PERUSED THEM FAIRLY OPENLY DURING RECENT MEETINGS.

XVI. NUMBERED PARAGRAPH SIX OF INSTRUCTIONS

INSTRUCTIONS (STATE 138355) INCLUDE NUMBERED PARAGRAPH SIX AS FOLLOWS:

"THE PRESIDENT HAS DECIDED THAT, IN PRINCIPLE, THE US PREFERS A 150 KT LIMIT ON INDIVIDUAL EXCAVATION PNES AND, IN THIS CONTEXT, WOULD BE WILLING TO ACCEPT A ONE MEGATON LIMIT ON THE AGGREGATE YIELD OF ALL SALVOS (CONTAINED AND EXCAVATION) AND FOREGO THE FISSION YIELD LIMIT AND ASSOCIATED MELT SAMPLES VERIFICATION TECHNIQUE FOR EXCAVATION PNES. WHILE THIS POSITION IS APPROVED IN SUBSTANCE, IT SHOULD NOT BE PUT FORTH BY THE DELEGATION UNTIL AUTHORIZED BY WASHINGTON."

PRESENT VIEW OF DELEGATION IS THAT IMPLEMENTATION OF INSTRUCTION PARAGRAPH SIX MIGHT BEGIN ALONG LINES OF ONE OF THREE GENERAL ALTERNATIVES AS FOLLOWS:

US SIDE COULD MAKE STATEMENT SUMMARIZING WHAT, IN OUR VIEW, WOULD BE INVOLVED IF PNE AGREEMENT:

(A) DOES (INCLUDING SPECIFIC FIGURE FOR LIMIT ON INDIVIDUAL EXCAVATION EXPLOSIONS), OR (B) DOES NOT PERMIT INDIVIDUAL EXCAVATION EXPLOSIONS LARGER THAN AGREED YIELD LIMIT FOR INDIVIDUAL EXCAVATION EXPLOSIONS. THIS WOULD BE ACCOMPANIED BY STATEMENT THAT ESTABLISHMENT OF AGREEMENT PERMITTING EXCAVATION PNES, WHETHER OR NOT IT SETS FORTH SPECIAL CONDITIONS FOR EXCAVATION EXPLOSIONS, REQUIRES THAT SOVIET SIDE PROVIDE CLEAR DESCRIPTION OF HOW IT PLANS TO ENSURE LTBT COMPLIANCE AND THAT THIS DESCRIPTION MUST ASSURE US THAT COMPLIANCE CAN BE REALIZED AS IT IS UNDERSTOOD BY US.

US SIDE COULD THEN SAY:

- (1) CHOICE OF (A) OR (B) IS UP TO SOVIET SIE;
- (2) THAT US SIDE PREFERS (B), AND GIVE AGRUMENTS TO SECRET

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SUPPORT THIS VIEW;

- (3) THAT US CAN ONLY AGREE TO (B).

XVII. DELEGATION ACTIONS

WITHIN CURRENT INSTRUCTIONS, DELEGATION NOW PLANS TO DO

FOLLOWING:

- (A) BRING WORK OF EXPERTS' GROUP VI ON INFORMATION EXCHANGE TO PROMPT CONCLUSION.
- (B) MAKE STATEMENT ON JULY 15 ON OBSERVER RIGHTS AND FUNCTIONS TO SUPPLEMENT STATEMENT OF JULY 10.
- (C) SCHEDULE MEETING TO ADDRESS DIFFERENCE IN NUMBERS DEFINING GROUP EXPLOSION.
- (D) LISTEN TO SOVIET STATEMENT ON LTBT COMPLIANCE IN RESTRICTED MEETING JULY 16.

SVIII. ESTIMATE OF SOVIET ACTIONS

IT IS OUR PRESENT JUDGMENT THAT SOVIET SIDE NOW PLANS TO DO FOLLOWING:

- (A) SUSPEND WORK OF EXPERTS' GROUP VI WITHOUT ADDRESSING INFORMATION EXCHANGES ASSOCIATED WITH OBSERVERS, PENDING AGREEMENT BETWEEN HEADS OF DELEGATIONS TO LAY THIS TASK ON EXPERTS.
- (B) LISTEN TO US SIDE ON OBSERVER RIGHTS AND FUNCTIONS BUT MAKE NO MEANINGFUL RESPONSE AT EARLY TIME.
- (C) TALK ABOUT LTBT COMPLIANCE, JULY 16, OR SOON THEREAFTER.
- (D) DO LITTLE OR NOTHING MORE OF SUBSTANTIVE NATURE UNTIL US SIDE SHOWS CLEAR SIGNS OF STIRRING ON ITEMS (A) AND (B) NOTED IN SECTION III.

XIX. DELEGATIONS RECOMMENDATIONS

- (A) FORWARD CURRENT VERSIONS OF PROTOCOLS SO THAT DELEGATION CAN WORK IN COLLABORATION WITH WASHINGTON IN DOING WHATEVER NEEDS TO BE DONE TO PUT THEM IN PROPER SHAPE.
 - (B) AUTHORIZE IMPLEMENTATION OF PARAGRAPH SIX OF INSTRUCTIONS.
 - (C) AUTHORIZE TABLING OF DRAFT TREATY AND PROTOCOLS BEFORE JULY 18.
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